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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
Early Access to Investigations of Employment Discrimination:
H. Kessler & Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
An employee of H. Kessler & Co. instituted a complaint in 1970 with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charging job discrimina-
tion on the basis of race and sex. The Commission issued to Kessler a de-
mand for access to evidence' in order to effectuate its statutory obligation
to investigate charges and determine if reasonable cause existed to believe
the allegations were true.2 In response, Kessler filed a petition in federal dis-
trict court to have the demand set aside. 3 Kessler argued that it should not
be forced to comply with the demand for the reason, inter alia,4 that the
Commission intended to release the information received by it to the com-
plaining employee, in violation of the non-disclosure provisions of title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 5 The federal district court denied
Kessler's motion to set aside the demand. However, it ruled that the Com-
mission could not reveal any results of its investigation to either party or
either party's counsel prior to subsequent court proceedings under the Act.6
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, but granted a request
for rehearing en banc. 7 Held, affirmed in part and reversed in part, re-
manded for further proceedings: The nondisclosure provisions of title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 do not prohibit the Commission from divulg-
ing to the parties or their attorneys information it obtains during an in-
Vestigation of a claim of unlawful discrimination. H. Kessler & Co. v.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 472 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
I. ENFORCING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN EMPLOYMENT
Even though several major amendments were enacted in 1972, the basic
statutory provisions to secure equal opportunity in employment are con-
tained in the Civil Rights Act of 19648 which created the Equal Employ-
'Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, title VII, § 710(a), 78 Stat. 264,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9 (Supp. II, 1973). The 1972 amendment replaced
the original demand procedure and permits the EEOC to issue subpoenas for infor-
mation and witnesses under the same authority exercised by the National Labor Re-
lations Board. See 29 U.S.C. § 161 (1970).
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. II, 1973).
3 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, title VII, § 710(c), 78 Stat. 264,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9 (Supp. II, 1973).
4 Other reasons cited by Kessler for refusing to comply with the demand were
rejected by the trial court. Kessler had claimed the information requested (1) was not
relevant, (2) had been previously supplied in another form, and (3) would be difficult
and onerous to obtain. H. Kessler & Co. v. EEOC, 53 F.R.D. 330, 332-33 (N.D.
Ga. 1971).
542 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. II, 1973), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a)(1970); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) (1970).8 H. Kessler & Co. v. EEOC, 53 F.R.D. 330, 341 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
7 H. Kessler & Co. v. EEOC, 468 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1972).842 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to
2000e-17 (Supp. II, 1973). The broad goals of title VII are the elimination of dis-
crimination in employment or employment-related activities against any individual
"because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... ." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970). Unlawful employment practices are not limited to those
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ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).9 The EEOC's administrative func-
tions consist of receiving charges of discrimination, conducting investigations,
conciliating disputes, and soliciting voluntary compliance from the alleged
violator where reasonable cause is found to exist. Prior to 1972, as a final
resort, the EEOC could only certify the controversy for suit by the com-
plaining party; now the EEOC may itself bring suit.10
Filing a charge alleging an unfair employment practice, as defined in
the Act 1 and by the regulations of the EEOC,12 invokes the Commission's
administrative processes. 13  Charges can be filed by a member of the
EEOC, by an aggrieved individual, or any person on his behalf.14  Origi-
inally, charges had to be made within ninety days after the violation oc-
curred.' 5 The courts, however, have given this requirement liberal interpre-
tation, thus expanding the statute of limitation.' 6
After receiving the charge, the EEOC investigates all relevant circum-
stances and gathers evidence pertaining to the complaint.' 7  A determina-
tion that there is reasonable cause to believe that the complaint has validity
is necessary to enable the EEOC to embark upon methods of "conference,
conciliation, and persuasion""' to obtain a co-operative agreement in end-
ing the unfair practice. Before 1972 failure of the alleged offender to
negotiate or compromise with the EEOC exhausted the active role of the
agency. Consequently, the incentives to settle the dispute with this ad-
ministrative body were slight under the original statute.
Should the administrative procedures of the EEOC yield no satisfactory
results, 19 only two methods were available to secure judicial determination
committed by an employer, id. § 2000e-2(b), but also discriminatory actions by em-
ployment agencies and labor organizations, id. § 2000e-2(c).
9 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (Supp. II, 1973). The EEOC consists of five members,
appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate for five-year
terms.
1042 U.S.C. §H 2000e-5(b), (e), (f) (Supp. II, 1973).
1142 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Supp. II, 1973).
12 29 C.F.R. § 1604-07 (1973).
13 The courts have uniformly given broad interpretations to the formalities required
for the filing of charges. See, e.g., Graniteville Co. (Sibley Division) v. EEOC, 438
F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1971) (informal letter charge will suffice); Sanchez v. Standard
Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970) (EEOC charge form, incorrectly filled
out, remains valid); Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 412 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1969)
(defect is curable by amendment).
14 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. II, 1973).
15 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1970).
16See, e.g., Belt v. Johnson Motor Lines, Inc., 458 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1972)
(continuing course of discrimination); Culpepper v. Reynolds Metal Co., 421 F.2d
888 (5th Cir. 1970) (invoking remedies under employment contract tolls time limitation
for filing charge with EEOC); Antonopulos v. Aerojet-General Corp., 295 F. Supp.
1390 (E.D. Cal. 1968) (extenuating circumstances justify delay in filing).
17 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1970). The statute also contains an elaborate pro-
cedure for deferral by the EEOC to state or local agencies administering their own fair
employment laws. However, jurisdiction is retained so the EEOC may intervene in
the event no resolution is achieved within varying time limits. 42 U.S.C. 8H 2000e-
5(b)-(e) (Supp. II, 1973).
18 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1970).
19 Though the Act does not directly require it, the courts have held that aggrieved
persons seeking to invoke their title VII rights must make their charges to the EEOC
and await its administrative determination before bringing suit in federal district court.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 405 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 918 (1969); Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968);
Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968).
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of the issue before the 1972 amendments. The Attorney General of the
United States could institute suit in federal district court when there was
"reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged
in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the
rights secured by this ;[statute] .... ,,20 Alternatively, the aggrieved in-
dividual's recourse, after the unsuccessful efforts of the EEOC to exact
voluntary compliance, was to bring a private lawsuit in federal court.21 Be-
fore 1972 the EEOC was required to issue a notice of eligibility to sue,
when requested, after sixty days had elapsed from the presentation of the
charge.2 2 Further, the complainant actually had but thirty days from that
notice to bring suit in the courts.2 8
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 197224 substantially amended
the original statute as to both administrative proceedings and enforcement
activities. In general, the applicable time periods in the Act were expanded
in most instances. For example, the applicant is now allowed 180 days
from the time of the alleged violation to file a charge, instead of the pre-
viously allowed ninety days. 25 Additionally, where the finding of reason-
able cause by the EEOC had a somewhat indefinite time limit in the
past,26 the amendment now requires that the determination be made within
120 days "so far as practicable. '2 7
The most far-reaching innovation contained in the 1972 amendments was
the vesting of enforcement power in the EEOC beyond its administrative
procedures. The amended Act now permits the EEOC to initiate court ac-
tion on behalf of complaining individuals. 28  In addition, the EEOC now
maintains concurrent jurisdiction with the Attorney General to file "pattern
and practice" suits and will succeed solely to that authority in 1974.29 Be-
fore it may bring suit, the EEOC must first substantiate that there is reason-
able cause to believe the complaint and it is unable to procure a conciliation
agreement. However, it need wait only thirty days from the filing of the
charge . 0  The employee bringing the charge is permitted to intervene in
the civil action of the EEOC.8'
The aggrieved individual may still enforce his own rights in court. Since
the EEOC is not required to sue, even upon finding reasonable cause or
failing to conciliate, its conduct does not preclude the private suit. When
20 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1970).
21 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970).
22 ld.
28 Id.
24 Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
25 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. II, 1973), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d)
(1970).
26 The time limit in the original statute was not specified; however, it could have
been no more than sixty days, because at the end of that period the EEOC was
obligated to issue, when asked, the notice of right to sue. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)
(1970).
27 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. II, 1973).
28 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (Supp. II, 1973). The EEOC may not sue a govern-
ment, government agency, or political subdivision, but must refer the case to the
Attorney General who may initiate suit.
29 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-6(c), (e) (Supp. II, 1973).
30 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (Supp. II, 1973).
31 Id.
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no reasonable cause is found by the agency, or after 180 days have elapsed
since submission of the complaint, the individual's right to sue accrues;
however, the EEOC must issue an authorization. The employee has ninety
days from receipt of notification to file pleadings in federal district court,
rather than thirty days in the unamended Act.82 The EEOC is empow-
ered to intervene in the private suit upon a showing that the "case is of
general public importance. '38
II. BALANCING THE CONFLICTING INTERESTS
Favorable Treatment of Complainants. Throughout the history of title
VII, the private individual has been charged with the prime responsibility
for protecting his own interests. To assist the individual in meeting this
burden, the courts, as well as the EEOC, have demonstrated a willingness
to construe broadly and liberally the statute's procedural requirements in
order to give every advantage to the aggrieved applicant.84 Of course,
prior to 1972 the overwhelming justification for this position lay in the lack
of enforcement power in the EEOC. Even though Congress had expressed
the national goal of fair and equal employment opportunity, it had
created an administrative agency with virtually no authority, leaving "[en-
forcement of the rights of aggrieved parties . . . exclusively in the federal
courts."3 5 The aggrieved individual, although preserving his own oppor-
tunity for an impartial determination of his complaint, was, in a much
broader sense, acting as a private attorney general in an area "with heavy
overtones of public interest."'36 In pursuing an independent remedy, the
private litigant was advancing national policy where no other competent
agency existed to effectuate the goal.
Since the paramount issues finally depend upon judicial decision, the
individual is not limited to any prior resolution of the problem through
his employment contract or the administrative procedures of the EEOC.
Only in the narrowest of circumstances will an arbitration award, pursuant
to an employment contract, be binding upon the courts as dispositive of the
controversy. In any event, it will not preclude the filing of a case, for a
court must decide whether or not to defer to the arbitration results. 37 Sim-
ilarly, the absence of a reasonable-cause finding by the EEOC, or its failure
82 ld.
83 Id.
34 See, e.g., Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 460-61 (5th Cir. 1970):
"[Clourts construing Title VII have been extremely reluctant to allow procedural techni-
calities to bar claims brought under the Act. Consequently, courts confronted with
procedural ambiguities in the statutory framework have, with virtual unanimity, resolved
them in favor of the complaining party."
35 Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357, 359 (7th Cir. 1968); see
Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1969); Jenkins v.
United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968).
36 Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 33 (5th Cir. 1968); see Edmonds
v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 315 F. Supp. 523 (D. Kan. 1970).
37 See, e.g., Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co., 467 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1972); cf. Newman
v. Avco Corp., 451 F.2d 743 (6th Cir. 1971). Several decisions are to the effect that
arbitration awards do not control subsequent court adjudication in any manner. See,
e.g., Malone v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 457 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1972).
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either to begin or conclude a conciliation agreement with a recalcitrant
employer will not limit the employee's option to institute suit. 3s
The advent of the 1972 amendments in no way detracts from the basic
premise of relying upon the courts for enforcement of the Act, but now the
EEOC may also bring the court contest.39 The congressional intent was to
shift the burden of initiating enforcement proceedings from the individual
to the public, through the agency of the EEOC. But, while expressing the
conviction that private actions should become the exception under the new
statutory scheme, 40 Congress was unwilling to eliminate completely the
private lawsuit. Congress acknowledged that the development of the law had
benefited from the private litigation, and realized that the problem of fair
employment was so immense that the EEOC could not reasonably be ex-
pected to control the entire field immediately.41
Two other specific provisions which had been enacted to assist the com-
plainant financially and to encourage him to bring suit were retained by
the 1972 amendments. Courts are still authorized to appoint attorneys for
the aggrieved individual "in such circumstances as the court may deem
just," and they may permit the commencement of the suit without pay-
ment of fees, costs, or security. 42 Reasonable attorney fees may be awarded
to the prevailing party in the suit. 43
Public Non-Disclosure. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains
three specific prohibitions on the disclosure of informaton obtained dur-
ing the course of the EEOC's administrative proceedings. The first for-
bids the EEOC to make public the charge filed by the complaining party.44
The second provides that "[njothing said or done during and as a part of
such informal endeavors [i.e., the EEOC's efforts to obtain voluntary com-
pliance through a conciliation agreement] may be made public by the
Commission . . . without the written consent of the persons concerned. ' '45
The third prohibition states that "[i]t shall be unlawful -for any officer
br employee of the Commission to make public in any manner whatever
any information obtained by the Commission pursuant to its authority
under this section prior to the institution of any proceeding under this sub-
chapter involving such information." '46  Violations are punishable as mis-
38 See, e.g., Flowers v. Laborers Local 6, 431 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1970); Fekete
v. United States Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1970).
39 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (Supp. II, 1973).4 0 H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 11-13 (1971); S. REP. No. 415, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (1971).
41 Id. To a great extent the fear that the EEOC would be unable to handle the
volume of complaints has been borne out. The EEOC has estimated that it would
have a backlog of 52,000 complaints at the end of Fiscal Year 1973 (June 30, 1973).
It anticipated an additional 45,000 new charges during Fiscal Year 1974. Hearings
on Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary and Related Agencies
Appropriations for 1974 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations,
93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 2/974, pt. 4, at 852 (1973). The EEOC expected to have
undertaken approximately 100 suits during Fiscal Year 1973, while private suits had
numbered approximately 2000. Id. at 889, 899.
42 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (Supp. II, 1973).
43 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970).
44 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. II, 1973).
45 Id.
46 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) (1970).
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demeanors, carrying a potential fine or imprisonment upon conviction. 47
The intent of Congress to proscribe "the making available to the general
public of unproven charges" 48 is plain on the face of the non-disclosure
sections. In the entire statutory fair employment plan these provisions are
the only clear concessions for the protection of the alleged wrongdoer. How-
ever, even part of these guarantees were eroded by Smith v. Universal
Services, Inc.49 where the Fifth Circuit held in a case of first impression
that the EEOC's investigative report and findings should have been ad-
mitted in evidence at a trial commenced by an aggrieved individual after
the EEOC had failed to conciliate his grievance. While agreeing that the
statute did not specifically mandate the admission, the court reasoned that
it likewise did not prohibit its use. Though the report contained both
facts and conclusions which the trial court must itself evaluate as any other
evidence in a de novo proceeding, "to ignore the manpower and resources
expended on the EEOC investigation and the expertise acquired by its
field investigators in the area of discriminatory employment practices
would be wasteful and unnecessary."50  Finally, the report was permitted,
although admittedly hearsay in character, as an exception to the hearsay
rule.
The EEOC has long maintained that allowing the complainant or his
attorney access to its investigative files, even prior to court proceedings, is
in no way inconsistent with the statutory language of the Act and com-
ports with the legislative policy of permitting the aggrieved party every
opportunity to secure judicial enforcement of his claim. This position is
expressed in the EEOC's current regulations,5 ' but is more specifically found
in a memorandum, prepared by the General Counsel of the EEOC, to pro-
vide guidance for field offices. 52 It states that the EEOC's investigative
report may be made available to the charging party's counsel after the
statutory period for investigation and conciliation has expired, no more than
sixty days under the original law, 53 but now 180 days.54 The rationale is
to permit the attorney to decide whether "the facts justify the commence-
ment of a civil action . . . and, if so, to obtain information relevant to
drafting the complaint. Before a report is made available, counsel must
agree that it will not be used for any other purpose. .... 55
47 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. II, 1973); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) (1970).
48 110 CONG. REC. 12723 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
49 454 F.2d 154 (5th Cir. 1972). The decision was rendered without reference
to the general public disclosure prohibition. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
The court merely concluded that the EEOC's investigative report and findings did not
have application to the ban on disclosure of conciliation efforts. 454 F.2d at 156-57
n.1; see text accompanying note 45 supra.
50454 F.2d at 157. Contra, Heard v. Mueller Co., 464 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1972);
accord, Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1972).
5129 C.F.R. § 1601.20 (1973): "This provision does not apply to such earlier
disclosures to the charging party, the respondent, witnesses, and representatives of
interested Federal, State, and local agencies as may be appropriate or necessary to the
carrying out of the Commission's functions .... ." Generally, the courts have accorded
the regulations of the EEOC "great deference," as expressive of congressional intent.
,Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971).52 The memorandum is reproduced in the Kessler opinion, 472 F.2d at 1149.
53 See note 26 supra.
54 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (Supp. II, 1973).
55 472 F.2d at 1149.
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III. H. KESSLER & Co. V. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION
After determining that only the more general of the nondisclosure pro-
visions, which provides that no employee or officer may make public any
information obtained by the EEOC prior to any proceeding, 56 was appli-
cable to the facts, the court in Kessler concluded that the question was
whether disclosure to parties or their attorneys is the equivalent of "pub-
lic." In replying negatively to the question, the court relied upon legisla-
tive history, statutory construction, and policy. In aid of its argument, the
court admitted that although there is "scant legislative history . . . available
with respect to this particular portion of the Act [that history which exists]
appears to support the position expressed by the Commission in its regula-
tion."'57  In the congressional debates which preceeded passage of title
VII, the sponsor of the compromise proposal which became law stated that
the bans intended were those on "publicizing and not on such disclosure
as is necessary to the carrying out of the Commission's duties under the
statute. s58 In addition, the Senate version of the 1972 amendments contained
a ban on divulgence of records or papers to anyone except Congress, gov-
ernment agencies, or for use before a court or grand jury. 50 In leaving
the original provisions intact in 1972, the court reasoned, Congress consid-
ered and rejected the more rigid restrictions the Senate proposal would have
created.
"To make public" is not defined in the statute, but a reading of the
other two prohibitions on disclosure indicated to the court that "public" did
not include parties to a controversy. The first section provides that "charges
shall not be made public."6 0 However, by terms of the statute the EEOC
is required to furnish a copy of the charge to the employer before beginning
its investigation. 6' The remaining section prohibits anything said or done
during the conciliation procedure to be made public "without the written
consent of the parties . ,,,62 thus implying that both parties would
know of the proceedings. The court concluded that all three provisions
should be reconciled to be consistent, and since two sections exclude par-
ties from the term "public," the other should as well.
The court's policy justifications for the holding presented the most com-
pelling arguments. The court rested its policy considerations, and in fact
its entire decision, on certain initial presumptions and conclusions. First,
"the complaining person is, almost by definition, a person in impecunious
56 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) (1970). The court noted, but did not decide, that the
term "proceeding" is not defined and could be susceptible to interpretation as applying
to the EEOC's conciliation functions. If so, any disclosure of information after that
"proceeding" would not be prohibited by the statute's language. 472 F.2d at 1151-52
n.3. The court, however, assumed that "proceeding" must refer to presentation of a
court case.
57 472 F.2d at 1150; see note 51 supra.
58 110 CoNG. REc. 12723 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
59 S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 55-56 (1971).




circumstances . . ."63 Second, the private litigant's position in employ-
ment discrimination suits is essential. 64  Third, there is a "very limited
time that is given to the charging party to file suit after the Commission
notifies him that it has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance (30
days) . *"... 65 The opinion foreshadowed its ultimate conclusion by in-
sisting that "it is obvious that the charging party literally needs all the help
he can get in order to procure counsel, convince him that a right of action
truly exists with evidence to support it, and prepare and file suit within
the statutory period .. "66
With this background the court questioned how the complainant could
ever have "more than a suspicion of discrimination without access to [the
EEOC's investigative data] ... ,"6 Assuming that the charging party
has no more than mere conjecture that he was the subject of an unfair em-
ployment practice, the majority maintained that the difficulty of persuading
an attorney to undertake a case was practically insurmountable. Evidence
was cited to support the contention that attorneys are reluctant to assume
the complexities of a title VII suit under the most favorable conditions,
for the subject area involves problems "not common to more frequently liti-
gated areas of the law."6 8 Even the allowance of legal fees to the prevailing
contestant would be of small consequence when an attorney could not be
found and when the aggrieved party had nothing to substantiate his claim.
The dissent objected to the holding, relying in main part upon the
court's initial per curiam decision 69 which had declared that the legislative
history on the point of public disclosure was "simply too general to be
helpful," 70 and also that the language of the statute was clear and did not
require interpretation. In rejecting the majority's policy arguments the dis-
sent disputed any allegation that "limiting publication of information to the
parties, as well as the general public, hindered the function or purpose of
the statute. Rather, these portions of the Act are intended to insure that
those directly involved . . . can fully and in good faith participate . . .
uninhibited by any threat that their statements and actions will be re-
leased .... ,,71 The dissenting justices stressed the point that any dis-
closure, particularly when expressly denied by the statute, would destroy any
prospects of obtaining unlitigated compliance, "the touchstone for settle-
ment of alleged violations of this Title of the Civil Rights Act. .... "72
63 472 F.2d at 1149.
64 Id. The court quotes Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 460 n.1
(5th Cir. 1970): "The importance of the private litigant in the context of Title VII
cannot be overemphasized."
65 472 F.2d at 1149-50.
661d. at 1150.
67Id. at 1152.
68 Petete v. Consolidated Freightways, 313 F. Supp. 1271, 1272 (N.D. Tex. 1970);
see Edmonds v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 315 F. Supp. 523 (D. Kan.
1970).
69 H. Kessler & Co. v. EEOC, 468 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1972).
70 d. at 27.
71 Id.
72 Id. While voluntary compliance may be the ideal resolution of the conflict, the
ability of the EEOC or the complainant to initiate a civil suit apparently provides the




The major problem with the Kessler decision is that it ignored the effect
of the 1972 amendments. The majority merely asserted the opinion that
"the provisions with which we are here concerned were left intact [by the
amendments] . . -,7 and the dissent never mentioned the extensive
alterations. While it is certainly true that the non-disclosure portions were
left unchanged, the conceptual framework on which the court postulated its
decision underwent substantial revision. Although recognizing that the in-
dividual interest should be retained by the continued practice of permitting
private litigation, the intent of Congress in vesting the EEOC with enforce-
ment power in the federal courts was to place the burden of promoting equal
opportunity in employment upon that public agency.74
The decision can be rationalized only as an interim measure to allow
the continuance of an established precedent during a transitional period,
for once the EEOC is able to fulfill its obligations under the new law, vir-
tually all of the court's policy underpinnings will be destroyed. The poverty
of the employee will make no difference if the EEOC brings suit; similarly,
the procurement of counsel will not be a factor. Certainly the importance
of protecting the individual's rights will not have changed, but the moving
party in most instances will be the EEOC rather that the aggrieved person.
And even assuming that the EEOC will never be truly effective because
of fiscal limitations or simply the enormity of the undertaking,75 the Kessler
court ignored the fact that the amendments expand the period in which to
bring suit after notice from thirty to ninety days.76 The longer time period
in conjunction with the broad discretionary authority of the court to appoint
counsel77 dispels, at least in part, the policy reasoning of the court that the
EEOC reports are needed to meet a short deadline for filing suit or to con-
vince an attorney to take the case.
Absent policy considerations, the statutory construction and legislative
history arguments of the court are seemingly tortured and superficial rea-
sons upon which to base the holding. For, even conceding that Congress
expressly excepted parties from the prohibitions on public disclosure in two
sections of the statute, it does not follow that any intent to do likewise
can be found on the face of the Act which affects the section in contro-
versy.78 Internal consistency, if important at all, is more validly served
by interpreting "public" in its ordinary sense to include anyone outside the
EEOC, subject only to the plain exceptions modifying the sections in which
the distinctions appear. Then, too, legislative history is normally not in-
voked unless the meaning of the statute is unclear. Nowhere is it con-
tended that the language used by Congress was ambiguous, but even if it
73 472 F.2d at 1150.
74 See text accompanying notes 39-41 supra.
75 See note 41 supra.
76 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (Supp.
II, 1973).
77 See text eccompanying note 42 supra.
78 See text accompanying note 46 supra.
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